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Abstract – This paper presents a new key predistribution scheme 
for sensor networks based on structured graphs. Structured graphs 
are advantageous in that they can be optimized to minimize the 
parameter of interest. The proposed approach achieves a balance 
between the number of keys per node, path lengths, network 
diameter and the complexity of routing algorithm. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Data in sensor networks, which are used for data collection, 
intruder detection, traffic and wildlife monitoring and medical 
procedure, needs to be cryptographically protected in sensitive 
applications such as battlefield and commerce. Limited 
computational power and memory in sensor networks precludes 
the use of asymmetric key cryptography and restricts the number 
of encryption/decryption keys that can be stored. As a result, the 
use of symmetric keys and distribution of keys before 
deployment becomes an obvious choice. 
Key predistribution in sensor networks has been modeled 
based on the theory of random graphs, as proposed by 
Eschenauer and Gligor (EG) [1]. The EG model is based on the 
assumptions that no a priori deployment knowledge is available, 
and a sensor can communicate only with a very small fraction of 
other sensors. However, these assumptions may not apply to 
every sensor network. For example, in a sensor network in 
which all or majority of sensors are within communication range 
of each other, a random graph may be an inefficient model for 
key distribution as it requires higher number of edges to 
guarantee connectivity. As a comparison, in a structured graph, 
only two keys per node are required to guarantee connectivity, 
irrespective of the network size. However, in a random graph 
with only 10,000 nodes, 15 keys are required to ensure that the 
network is connected with a probability of 0.99999 [1]. 
Structured graphs can be optimized with respect to different 
parameters such as network diameter, the average shortest path 
length between any two nodes in the network, the clustering 
coefficient, the number of keys a node is required to store and 
routing complexity. 
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Approaches similar to EG, require the use of a key discovery 
phase as the sensors do not know with which other sensors they 
share keys. This entails a broadcast of message to every other 
node after deployment which is followed by a 
challenge/response phase [1]. Conversely, in our model the keys 
are distributed in a predetermined fashion and a key discovery 
phase is not required. Also, each key can be chosen to be unique, 
ensuring that only the intended node can decrypt the message 
and no other nodes can listen in on the conversation. 
After the key discovery phase [1], a node wanting to 
communicate with a node with which it does not share an 
encryption/decryption key perform path discovery. There are 
several problems with path discovery. Determining the shortest 
path to every other node on the network requires the knowledge 
and storage of the complete network topology (or the adjacency 
matrix of size 2N ) at the node that wants to discover the 
shortest path. Since in a random graph the adjacency matrix is 
not predetermined, every node will have to communicate back 
and forth to build this matrix. This is an enormous 
communication burden on the network. In the structured graph 
approach, we eliminate the path discovery phase and present a 
predetermined efficient routing algorithm that establishes a 
worst case path length of   22 )(log 82 +
N
 and requires the storage 
of only )(log2 NO  keys. 
Chan, et. al., [2] proposed the use of a q -composite scheme 
in which 1>q  keys were to be shared between every pair of 
nodes in a random graph. Although this provided better 
resilience than [1], it requires an increase in the number of keys 
to be stored on the nodes or a decrease in pool size. While the 
first requirement is a burden on memory, decreasing the pool 
size increases the probability of the same key being reused 
between more than two nodes. 
Du, et. al. [3] and Liu and Ning [4] propose a threshold 
scheme in which the adversary needs to compromise more than 
a certain number of nodes to subvert the network. In [6-8] 
  
deployment knowledge is used to reduce the number of keys 
required to share. In the proposed scheme, we only assume that 
the nodes are within communication range of each other without 
the need for any specific deployment topology and we see that 
the capture of a single node only reveals 1)(log2 2 −N
 
keys. 
II. THE PROPOSED KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEME 
One may view the elements in fig. 1(a) as nodes in a sensor 
network arranged in the increasing order of their node IDs (1 to 
N ), in a sequence. An arc between node i  and node j  
indicates that the nodes share a common encryption/decryption 
key and hence can communicate securely. Further, every node is 
assumed to have similar connections where each connection is 
bidirectional since the shared key makes it possible to 
communicate in both directions. 
If we say that every node i  shares a key with nodes i +1, 
i +2, i +4, i +8, i +16, …, )(log 22 Ni +  (computed modulo N ), 
then the a network with N  nodes has )(log2 NN ×  total 
connections. Further, since every connection is bidirectional, 
and the network is symmetric, such a key distribution strategy 
results in 1)(log2 2 −N
 
connections for every node (where N  is 
a power of 2). This is illustrated in figures 1(b) for 16=N . A 
similar routing table has been used in peer-to-peer data look up 
protocols [5], but, unlike our case, connections there are 
unidirectional. 
In order to securely communicate with the nodes with which 
node i  does not directly share an encryption key, the message is 
routed via multiple hops in the following manner (the routing 
protocol): 
1. To securely communicate with node q , node i  first 
encrypts the message using the encryption key it shares with 
node m  that is closest to the destination and with which it 
(node i ) has a direct connection and sends the encrypted 
message to node m . 
2. Node m  then decrypts the message, and checks if node q  
is its direct contact. If it is, then node m  encrypts the 
message using the encryption key it shares with node q  and 
sends the message to node q  directly.  However, if q  is not 
one of m ’s direct contacts, then node m  locates the next 
node, l , that is closest to node q , among its direct contacts, 
and encrypts the message with the encryption key its shares 
with node l  and sends the encrypted message to it. 
3. Node l  repeats step 2, and so on until the message reaches 
node q . 
 
The closeness of node a  to node b  is determined by 
computing (Node ID )(a −  Node ID )(b ) mod N , where Node 
ID )(a ≤  Node ID )(b . 
The parameters considered in the proposed model for key 
distribution are the following: 
1. Network diameter. 
2. Average shortest path length. 
3. Number of keys that a node is required to store. And, 
4. Clustering coefficient. 
 
(a)                                                      (b) 
Figure 1. (a) Connections that node 1 establishes. All the nodes establish 
shared keys in a similar fashion. (b) Connections for all the 16 nodes. 
Theorem 1: Consider a network with N  nodes, where 
kN 2= , for some integer 3≥k , such that every node shares 
keys with 1)(log2 2 −N  other nodes as described above, then 
any two nodes can securely communicate in at most 
22
)(log 82 +


 N hops. 
Proof: In our network, every connection is bidirectional and 
we wish to determine the upper bound on the distance between 
any two nodes i  and q  in the network. Without loss of 
generality, if node q  is not a direct contact of node i , then 
assume that node i  contacts one of its direct connections, that is 
closest to node q  and routes the message using the routing 
algorithm presented above. 
Further it is seen that the placement of connections of node 
i  slices the network into pieces such that the largest piece is of 
size 4/N . Therefore, node i  would, in the worst case, have to 
contact one of the nodes at the edge of the largest slice. Since, 
node i  sends the message to the connection closest to the 
destination, the maximum distance after the first hop, between 
the destination and the node that receives the packet will be 
42
1 N
⋅ . Consequently, the distance after 1-hop is reduced to 
8
NM =  in the worst case. 
  
Routing continues in a similar fashion after the first hop. 
However, the node connections are such that the largest slice is 
half the size of the remaining distance, because the remaining 
part of the network no longer forms a circle. Consequently, the 
distance between the message and the destination, second hop 
onwards, only reduces to ¼ the size of the remaining distance. 
This process is repeated until the destination node is reached by 
repeatedly dividing the remaining distance by ¼ at each step. 
Hence, after m  steps, the distance from node q  is reduced to 
mm
MM
224
= . 
When xM 2= , where =x even, then repeated division by 4 
results in the last step distance being 1; when =x odd, this 
distance is 2. However, in both cases, the destinatination is one 
hop away.  Consequently, division by 4 stops when either, 
 
122 =m
M ⇒
 
mM 22=
 
⇒
 2
log2 Mm =
 , when M2log  is even, 
and 
 
222 =m
M ⇒
 
122 += mM
 
⇒
 2
1log2 −
=
M
m
 , when M2log  is odd. 
Adding the first hop and the last hop to the above expression, 
and noting that when N2log  is even M2log  is odd and vice 
versa, we get the following upper bounds for the path lengths, 
Path length = 22
log 82 +
N
, when N2log  is odd, and 
Path length = 22
1log 82 +
−
N
, when N2log  is even.           
Combining the two cases above yields an expression for the 
upper bound on the path length: 22
log 82 +


 N
.                              
Example 1. For a network of size 1024=N , the diameter of 
the network is   522 272
log 8
1024
2
=+=+



. Whereas, when 
2048=N , the diameter of the network is 
  622 282
log 8
2048
2
=+=+



. 
One can argue that for secure communication between 
sensor nodes, the nodes must share a key, represented by a link 
between the nodes. Each node has a “view” that is limited to 
these direct links. For the purpose of secure transmission of 
messages, a node can effectively only “see” its direct links and 
to send a message to a node other than its direct links, the 
message is routed via intermediate nodes, encrypting and 
decrypting the data at each hop. 
Theorem 2: The routing protocol described above, results in 
the shortest possible path, for the given connections, between the 
starting node and the destination node. 
Proof: Since every node’s “view” is limited to 1)(log2 2 −N  
nodes, it can securely only contact those nodes that are its direct 
connections. Hence, the best strategy without a global view 
(knowledge) is to use a greedy approach, i.e. to choose the local 
best at every node.  
To securely route a message to the destination node, every 
node sends the message to one of its direct contact that is closest 
to the destination node. As a consequence, the distance between 
the starting node and the destination node decreases at each step 
to the smallest possible at that step, making the algorithm 
optimal, for the given connections, resulting in the shortest 
possible path.                                                                  
The diameter of a network is defined as the longest shortest 
path length in the network. From theorem 1 and 2 the diameter 
of the network is 22
log 82 +


 N
, when N  is a power of 2. And 
when 122 +<< kk N , for some integer k , the diameter varies 
between the diameters for network of sizes k2  and 12 +k . 
 
Figure 2. Average shortest path length in the proposed network (a trend line 
is also shown). 
The second parameter we consider is the average shortest 
path length. This determines the average number of hops needed 
to transmit a message securely between any random pairs of 
nodes. Fig. 2 plots the average shortest path length for network 
of various sizes using the proposed model. When the network 
increases 10 fold from 100 nodes to 1000 nodes, the average 
path length increases less than 1.5 times. This shows that our 
model is scalable, i.e. with a very large increase in the network 
size the average path length only increases a small fraction. 
  
The third parameter to consider is the number of keys that a 
node needs to store in order to ensure that the network is 
connected and maintain a small average path length. We know 
that the minimum number of connections required to ensure 
network connectivity is 2. That is, if a every node i  shares a key 
with node 1+i  and 1−i  (computed modulo N ), then the 
network is connected. However, this approach results in a 
average shortest path length of 4
N
 and a diameter of 2
N
.   
In order to reduce the path lengths, 1)(log2 2 −N  long 
distance connections have been introduced, as a result, each 
node stores 1)(log2 2 −N   keys, when  N  is a power of 2. 
When 122 +<< kk N , for some integer k , the number of keys 
vary between the number of keys for the cases k2
 
and 12 +k . 
The fourth parameter that we consider is the clustering 
coefficient. Clustering coefficient measures the local 
connectivity of the nodes and was introduced in [9]. It is 
expected, in a network, that local communication is 
comparatively more common than long distance communication. 
If nodes are deployed such that node IDs close to each other are 
closely located topographically, then they can communicate with 
each other with very few hops. Fig. 3 shows the clustering 
coefficient of our model when compared to a random graph. 
  
Figure 3. Clustering coefficient comparison. 
Node authentication and reuse of keys: Since, every node 
connection is pre-determined and not randomly chosen, nodes 
know with which nodes they share keys. Similar pair-wise key 
distribution has been discussed in [3] and [4], however, unlike in 
our case, they pick the pairs randomly. Advantages of pair-wise 
key distribution is that we can ensure that each shared key is 
unique and there is no need for key discovery phase. Further, 
instead of randomly picking the pairs, since we have picked the 
pairs in a specific order, the routing procedure is predetermined. 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
We have presented a scheme for key predistribution in 
sensor networks. The proposed scheme eliminates the key 
discovery and path determination overheads. We have proposed 
an efficient routing mechanism that guarantees  22
log 82 +


 N
 
diameter and the nodes only store )(log2 NO  keys. 
Further work is needed to deal with node failures and node 
joins. Also, it would be of interest to determine the performance 
of methods based on structured graphs when only a percentage 
of nodes are reachable after deployment. In the case of node 
failures, a number of alternate routes exist since every node has 
1)(log2 2 −N  connections.  
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
This research has been partly funded by the Center for 
Telecommunication and Network Security (CTANS), Oklahoma 
State University. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Eschenauer, L. and Gligor, V. D. 2002. A key-management scheme for 
distributed sensor networks. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on 
Computer and Communications Security. Pages: 18 - 22, 2002. 
[2] Haowen Chan, Adrian Perrig, Dawn Song, "Random Key Predistribution 
Schemes for Sensor Networks," IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 
Pages: 197, 2003. 
[3] W. Du, J. Deng, Y. S. Han, and P. K. Varshney. A pairwise key pre-
distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks. In Proceedings of the 10th 
ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security. Pages: 42-51, 
2003. 
[4] D. Liu and P. Ning. Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor 
networks. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security. Pages: 52-61, 2003. 
[5] I. Stoica, R. Morris, D. Karger, M. F. Kaashoek and H. Balakrishnan. Chord: 
A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications. 
In Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Applications, Technologies, 
Architectures, and Protocols For Computer Communications, SIGCOMM 
'01. Pages 149-160, 2001. 
[6] W. Du, J. Deng, Y.S. Han, S. Chen, and P.K. Varshney. A key management 
scheme for wireless sensor networks using deployment knowledge. In 
Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and 
Communications Society, INFOCOM ’04. Vol. 1, pages 586-597, 2004. 
[7] D. Liu and P. Ning. Improving key predistribution with deployment 
knowledge in static sensor networks. ACM Transactions on Sensor 
Networks. Vol. 1. No. 2, pages 204-239, 2005. 
[8] P. De, Y. Liu and S. K. Das. Deployment-aware modeling of node 
compromise spread in wireless sensor networks using epidemic theory. ACM 
Transactions on Sensor Networks. Volume 5, issue 3, pages 1-33, 2009. 
[9] D. J. Watts and S. H. Strogatz. Collective dynamics of 'small-world' 
networks. Nature 393: 440-42, 1998. 
